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I. INTRODUCTION
Violent crime fueled by drug profits is not a new problem for our
nation's inner cities. Police struggle to adapt their tactics to changing
street conditions while still safeguarding the constitutional rights of
citizens they have sworn to protect. The summer of 2008 marked a
tipping point for the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") of
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2010; B.S., Cornell University, 2005. I would like to thank my parents Gary
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Washington, D.C. Drive-by shootings ravaged the neighborhood of
Trinidad,' and the MPD responded with an innovative program designed
to curb the violence.2 The following hypothetical illustrates the basic
facts of the program along with a collateral restriction of civil liberties
that generated intense controversy.
Imagine if you and your spouse have a picnic under the same tree
each year to commemorate your anniversary. That special day rolls
around, and while you're travelling toward your picnic spot, you
encounter a heavily-guarded police checkpoint. A law enforcement
officer politely explains that there has been a recent crime wave in
this area, and that the police have sealed off the entire neighborhood.
The officer then requests your identification and, as directed by a
municipal ordinance, asks why you are driving into Trinidad. You
respond truthfully, but do not know that the ordinance requires a
legitimate purpose for passing through the checkpoint and entering
the neighborhood. Is your purpose sufficiently legitimate to pass
scrutiny?
The MPD called it a Neighborhood Safety Zone ("NSZ").4 In
reality, it was a checkpoint program designed to exclude motorists
seeking to enter this high-crime neighborhood without a legitimate
purpose.5 These checkpoints were set up at major entrances to the
neighborhood, and auxiliary streets were blocked-off.6  When a driver
approached the checkpoint, as illustrated from the hypothetical, he was
1. For a contemporary history of Trinidad, see Paul Schwartzman, Reality
Checkpoint: Trinidad Residents Reflect on Their Neighborhood's Future, WASH. POST,
July 8, 2008 at BOl.
2. See Allison Klein, D.C. Police to Check Drivers In Violence-Plagued Trinidad,
WASH. POST, June 5, 2008 at A01 [hereinafter "Police to Check Drivers"] ("Since April
1, the Trinidad neighborhood has had seven homicides, 16 robberies and 20 assaults with
dangerous weapons, according to police data.").
3. Compare Daniel LeDuc, Council Grills Lanier, Nickles on Checkpoint, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2008 at B04 ("'We are tired of having to listen to gunfire. We are tired of
having bullets pierce the sanctity of our homes.' Concerns about constitutional intrusions
were 'academic discussion,' [Trinidad resident Kathy] Henderson said, adding that
residents felt that 'our rights are being violated every time people descend on our
community and commit crime."') with Police to Check Drivers, supra note 2 ("'My
reaction is, welcome to Baghdad, D.C.,' said Arthur Spitzer, legal director for the
ACLU's Washington office. 'I mean, this is craziness. In this country, you don't have to
show identification or explain to the police why you want to travel down a public
street."').
4. See Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd 571
F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 2009). Mills is a recent and highly publicized example of a
high-crime exclusionary checkpoint.
5. See infra Part II.C for the definition of a "legitimate purpose."
6. See Mills, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 50-51.
668 [Vol. 114:2
2009] Is THERE A RIGHT TO TRAVEL FREELY ON PUBLIc FoRA?
asked for identification, and denied entry if he either did not provide a
7reason, or provided an inadequate reason.
These types of high-crime exclusionary checkpoints are rare but not
unique. A procedurally similar checkpoint was conducted in New York
City in 1992.9 A common feature of these checkpoints is that drivers are
permitted to park their cars outside the area and walk in without police
interference.' 0 In each case, only vehicles were barred." And in each
case, the public asked the obvious question: Is this legal?l 2
The NSZs present a compelling factual scenario with which to
analyze whether citizens have a fundamental right to travel on public
roadways.' 3  If citizens have a right to localized travel, it is squarely
implicated by exclusionary checkpoints. This Comment focuses on
precedent establishing a fundamental right to this type of localized
movement-properly phrased as the "right to travel freely on public
fora."l 4 This right has been described as "an everyday right, a right we
depend on to carry out our daily life activities. It is, at its core, a right of
function."' 5  However, this right is not meant to be so broad as to
invalidate stop signs or enable motorists to justify double-parking. 6
7. See id. For simplicity's sake, this Comment will use the masculine pronoun "he"
to represent both the masculine and the feminine pronoun.
8. See Rachel R. Watson, Comment, When Individual Liberty and Police
Procedure Collide: The Unconstitutionality of High-Crime Area Checkpoints, 24 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 95, 103-04 (1998).
9. See Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 1996).
10. See, e.g., Mills, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
11. See id.; Maxwell, 102 F.3d at 666-68.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part III.B. Irrespective of the fact that the Mills and Maxwell courts
analyzed the checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment still protects fundamental liberty
interests. Those cases were framed as Fourth Amendment challenges and did not explore
whether other rights of the motorists were abridged. As discussed infra Part II.C, high-
crime exclusionary checkpoints impose more than a temporary and limited inconvenience
on a party. They bar entrance to a geographic area for all without a legitimate purpose,
and so the Fourth Amendment is not the only right affected. Cf Johnson v. City of
Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the argument that the Fourth
Amendment controlled a challenge to an ordinance that excluded individuals from a
geographic area based on their criminal history). The Johnson case is discussed infra
Part II.B.3.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. Johnson, 310 F.3d at 498.
16. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the level of scrutiny and its relationship to
restrictions that facilitate the right to travel. See also Benjamin C. Sasse, Note, Curfew
Laws, Freedom of Movement, and the Rights ofJuveniles, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 68 1,
706-711 (2000) (suggesting a modified undue burden standard as the proper level of
scrutiny to adequately protect the right to travel freely on public fora); Andrew C. Porter,
Comment, Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 Nw. U.
L. REv. 820, 853-56 (1992).
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The primary goal of this Comment is to apply a right to localized
travel claim to a police checkpoint program in a way that has never been
done. The exclusionary nature of the NSZs makes them an ideal testing
ground for analyzing whether a fundamental right to travel freely on
public fora exists. Since the NSZ program was never challenged on this
ground,17 this Comment acts as that lawsuit.
Part II.A examines the broad term "right to travel," and categorizes
the leading circuit court cases while dispelling the myth that there is a
circuit split on the issue of intrastate travel. Part II.B defines the NSZ as
a high-crime exclusionary checkpoint, and contrasts traditional police
checkpoints with the NSZ program. Part III analyzes Supreme Court and
circuit precedent to see whether a fundamental right to "travel freely on
public fora" exists, and considers varying levels of scrutiny. Part III.B
discusses potential levels of scrutiny to be applied to localized travel
claims. The NSZ checkpoint program is then analyzed to see whether it
is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental purpose.
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that a reviewing court would
invalidate the NSZ checkpoint because it infringes upon the fundamental
right to localized travel, and is not necessary to reduce violent crime.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is the Right to Travel?
"The word 'travel' is not found in the text of the Constitution. Yet
the 'constitutional right to travel from one State to another' is firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence."' 8 The Supreme Court has only ruled on
the right to interstate travel, and has consistently held that this right is
fundamental.' 9 By contrast, the Court has never definitively addressed
the existence of a right to intrastate travel, explicitly reserving the issue
17. The NSZ program was challenged in Mills as unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, but plaintiffs there did not press a right to travel claim.
18. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 757 (1966)). The only textual guarantee of a right to travel is to members of
Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cls. 1 & 2 ("The Senators and Representatives ....
shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House .... ).
19. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500 ("The 'right to travel' discussed in our cases
embraces at least three different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State
to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than
an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers
who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
State.").
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in the 1974 decision Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, and not
21considering it since that decision. Memorial Hospital invalidated
Arizona's one-year residency requirement for state-funded non-
emergency hospital care on equal protection grounds.22 Because of the
facts of this case, it is unsurprising that the Court used the term
"intrastate travel" to refer to the correlative right. 2 3  But case law
illustrates that this issue cannot be resolved simply by referring to
whether a traveler crosses the state line.24 Courts have recognized
roughly five types of travel: (1) the right to freedom of movement;25
(2) the right to travel freely on public fora;26 (3) the right to intrastate
travel;2 7 (4) the right to interstate travel;2 8 and (5) the right to
international travel.29
This Comment focuses on the right to travel freely on public fora,
and only touches on analogous rights to draw upon Supreme Court
precedent, as in the case of interstate travel, or dispel notions that there is
20. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974) (referring
to the "constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel" as "a question
we do not now consider").
21. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 259-60 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that "the
Court has said nothing conclusive on the matter since [Memorial Hospital]"). But see id.
at 260 n.8 (referring to Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), as a case decided after
Memorial Hospital that did not conclusively decide the right to travel issue, but was
decided on vagueness grounds, and thus "provide[s] at best indirect support for .. . the
kind of localized intrastate movement at issue").
22. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 253.
23. Id.
24. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 698-703.
25. See, *e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2002)
("[W]e do not use the right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways
synonymously with a right to freedom of movement. To be sure, a right of freedom of
movement could encompass a right to localized travel, but it could also include interstate
and international travel components.").
26. See infra Part III.A (finding the right to travel freely on public fora to be a
fundamental right protected by substantive due process); Sasse, supra note 16, at 704-16.
27. See infra Part II.A (categorizing the right to "intrastate travel" into more
doctrinally specific segments); Sasse, supra note 16, at 698-704.
28. See Nicole I. Hyland, Note, On the Road Again: How Much Mileage Is Left on
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and How Far Will it Travel?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
187, 244-52 (2001) (describing the history of the right to interstate travel); Christopher S.
Maynard, Note, Nine-Headed Caesar: The Supreme Court's Thumbs-Up Approach to the
Right to Travel, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 297, 299-313 (2000) (same); Five Borough
Bicycle Club v. City of New York, 483 F. Supp. 2d 351, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he
right to travel ordinarily refers to the right of a citizen to migrate freely from state to
state ... ) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
29. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (taking a restrictive view of a
right to international travel). But see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ("The
right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the
due process of law under the Fifth Amendment."). For an excellent analysis of the right
to international travel, see Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56
UCLA L. REV. 271 (2008).
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only one predominate term, as in the case of intrastate travel. To avoid
being unduly repetitious, the "right to travel freely on public fora" will
be used interchangeably with "the right to localized travel."
Simply put, the right to travel freely on public fora is the right of a
citizen to walk along a public sidewalk or drive on a public roadway. It
conveniently includes a broad textual restriction against the invasion of
private property rights.3 0 Access to a particular public place, such as a
public building, more directly implicates the right to "freedom of
movement," and is therefore beyond the scope of this Comment.3 1
Additionally, this Comment does not address the impact of a formal
emergency situation, such as an evacuation order or the imposition of
martial law, on the right to travel freely on public fora.3 2
B. The Right to Intrastate Travel: A True Circuit Split?
Right-to-travel jurisprudence has been afflicted by two systemic
problems. First, courts use imprecise and varied terminology when
defining and discussing the right to travel in case law.3 3 This Comment
reviews federal appellate case law on intrastate and localized travel,
draws distinctions between types of travel, and provides a system to
categorize these cases.34 Second, courts locate the right to travel in
various constitutional provisions, often without providing a rationale for
the decision.3 ' After reviewing relevant precedent, the Third Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court has found the right to interstate travel in
30. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 81 (6th ed. 2006) (describing property
as "rights or relationships among people with respect to things" and including "the right
to exclude" as an inherent aspect of real property ownership).
31. See Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Indeed, it
would distort the right to free travel beyond recognition to construe it as providing a
substantive right to cross a particular parcel of land, enter a chosen dwelling, or gain
admittance to a specific government building. Williams's right to intrastate travel might
prevent the Town from burdening Williams's ability to drive, walk, or otherwise proceed
from his home to the Center, but it has no bearing whatsoever on whether, upon
Williams's arrival, the Town must admit him into the facility.").
32. See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Enslaved Constitution: Obstructing the Freedom to
Travel, 70 U. PITT. L. REv. 233, 241-42 (2008) (discussing Dickerson v. City of Gretna, a
case involving the right to travel during Hurricane Katrina).
33. Compare Cole v. Hous. Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970)
(interpreting the definition of "travel" recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), as a "sense of migration with intent to settle and abide") with Johnson v. City of
Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002) (listing cases that refer to the rights
interchangeably) and Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1975)
(finding no "fundamental right to commute").
34. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text (discussing three types of "travel").
35. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 630 ("We have no occasion to ascribe the
source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.").
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seven different constitutional provisions.36 As a general matter, these
two problems help explain why the jurisprudence surrounding the right
to travel is considered so confused.
The absence of guidance from the Supreme Court has created
significant disagreement between courts that have considered a right to
travel claim, regardless of whether it was framed as an intrastate right or
a localized right.3 7 Circuit courts have responded by recognizing various
forms of the "right to intrastate travel" as fundamental, creating a
"split" between the Federal Courts of Appeals.39 This Comment will
argue, however, that factual differences prevent this jumble of case law
from being considered a true circuit split.4 0 Characterizing these cases as
"recognizing" any type of travel is inexact and unadvisable because the
claims are so diverse that they cannot realistically present a coherent
jurisprudence.4 1 Clear lines must be drawn between cases implicating
different types of movement that is referred to under the overarching
term "right to travel."
In a thoughtful Note on juvenile curfews, one student commentator
aptly describes the difficulty in this area of the law in a heading titled
"Doctrinal Disagreement or Sloppy Rights Talk?"4 2  This Comment
adopts that Commentator's classification, and attempts to demonstrate
36. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 259-67 (3d Cir. 1990) (detailing the seven
constitutional provisions where the right to travel had previously been found).
37. At this point, it seems like the Supreme Court has little interest in resolving this
"circuit split." See Johnson, 310 F.3d at 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 915
(2003).
38. Currently, the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have recognized a
limited fundamental constitutional right to intrastate travel. See, e.g., Johnson, 3 10 F.3d
at 484 (6th Cir. 2002); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997); Lutz,
899 F.2d at 255 (3d Cir. 1990); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646
(2d Cir. 1971); Cole v. Hous. Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). See
generally Five Borough Bicycle Club v. City of New York, 483 F. Supp. 2d 351, 362 n.
68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting the circuit split); see Hyland, supra note 28, at 239 n.379.
39. Currently, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have not recognized the
intrastate right to travel. See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (en banc); Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd
without opinion, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900
(5th Cir. 1975); Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally Townes
v. City of Saint Louis, 949 F. Supp 731 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (noting a split); Porter, supra
note 16, at 842-46 (1992) (same).
40. Compare Cole, 435 F.2d at 811 (interpreting the definition of "travel"
recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), as a "sense of migration with
intent to settle and abide") with Johnson, 310 F.3d at 498 (listing cases that refer to the
rights interchangeably). See generally Sasse, supra note 16, at 698-99. This Comment
owes much to Benjamin J. Sasse for the novel claim set forth in his Note.
41. See infra Part II.A and accompanying text.
42. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 698.
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the need for case law to be separated according to the rights implicated
by certain types of conduct.43
Three categories emerge from case law: "(1) a right to commute;
(2) a right to receive public housing in the context of durational
residency requirements; and (3) a right to travel freely within a given
jurisdiction, or a right to travel on public fora."44 A brief overview of a
typical case under each category will give context to the debate
surrounding a right to intrastate travel, and illustrate that this area cannot
be considered a "circuit split."
1. A Right to Commute
Employees often claim that the broad right to travel includes a so-
called "right to commute."4 5  This claim is often asserted when
employees challenge bona fide continuing residency requirements, which
are local laws that require public employees to live within a specified
geographic boundary of their employer.4 6 Courts addressing the issue
have held that the right to commute is not fundamental, and have
subjected these laws to rational basis review. 47 An example of this type
of case is Wright v. City ofJackson, which involved a suit by nonresident
firefighters challenging an ordinance requiring municipal employees to
live within City limits. 48
The Wright court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
firefighters' claim, ruling that nothing in the Supreme Court's right to
travel precedent requires the application of strict scrutiny.49 The Fifth
Circuit in Wright also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, where the Court dismissed an
identical "right to commute" claim from the Michigan Supreme Court for
want of a federal question.so The Wright court noted that this dismissal
43. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 698-99.
44. Sasse, supra note 16, at 698-99 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
45. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 699-700.
46. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 699-700.
47. See e.g., Andre v. Bd. of Trs. of the Vill. of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48, 50 (7th Cir.
1977) (listing cases upholding similar residency restrictions on rational basis review).
48. Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901-03 (5th Cir. 1975). The ordinance
at issue "require[d] all municipal employees .. . to maintain their domicile and principal
place of residence within the corporate limits of the City during the period of their
employment." Id. at 901 n. 1.
49. Id. at 903-04.
50. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. 1971),
cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972) (reading in its entirety, "The appeal is dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question.").
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was a decision on the merits, and recognized that other courts
considering the matter had come to the same conclusion.
The "right to commute" cases illustrate only one type of claim
brought under the larger term "intrastate travel." Although some courts
point to decisions like Wright for the proposition that there is no
fundamental right to intrastate travel, courts should exercise extreme care
in analyzing the type of claim at issue, and not assume that a holding
from a factually dissimilar case is mandatory authority. 52 The Supreme
Court did not definitively rule on the existence vel non of a fundamental
right to intrastate travel. Furthermore, circuit courts should not
exaggerate the importance of this dismissal for want of a federal
question. Treating decisions like Wright as binding for all intrastate and
localized travel claims is a significant overstatement of its precedential
value.53
2. Durational Residency Requirements
Durational residency requirements are laws that "require an
individual to be in the jurisdiction for a certain amount of time before he
can receive [a] government benefit or engage in some kind of activity." 54
These issues have been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court in the
context of interstate travel,s and the intrastate travel cases are a logical
extension of those opinions.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,6 the Supreme Court invalidated laws
requiring welfare recipients to reside in a state for at least one year to be
51. Wright, 506 F.2d at 902 (citing Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972)).
52. For a particularly egregious example of using dissimilar cases as binding
precedent, see Dickerson v. City of Gretna, No. 05-6667, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29460
at *5-11 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2007). Dickerson involved a right to intrastate travel claim
brought by Hurricane Katrina evacuees after they were forcibly blocked from crossing a
bridge into another municipality. Id. at *2-3. Plaintiffs' claim was dismissed on
summary judgment for failure to state a federal cause of action. The court considered
itself "bound by the Fifth Circuit precedent of Wright." Id. at *4, 11. See Crusto, supra
note 32, at 241-42 (discussing Dickerson).
53. Wright and its progeny have amassed many critics. See, e.g., Porter, supra note
16, at 835. See generally Comment, The Significance of Dismissals "For Want of a
Substantial Federal Question: " Original Sin in the Federal Courts, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
785 (1968).
54. 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
§ 18.38(a) (4th ed. 2008) (analyzing Supreme Court case law invalidating durational
residency requirements). For a good analysis of the right to intrastate travel and
durational residency requirements, see Hyland, supra note 28, at 230-37 (using the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide certain rights
to intrastate travel).
55. See id. § 18.38(a) (noting that most Supreme Court rulings involved residency
requirements).
56. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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eligible for benefits.5 7 The Court concluded that the residency
classification infringed upon the fundamental right to travel, and applied
strict scrutiny to the laws, requiring them to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest.58 Similar laws have been invalidated
because they deter the exercise of interstate travel, sometimes referred to
as the "right of migration."5
Many circuit courts apply the Supreme Court's rationale to
invalidate similarly protectionist laws which precondition certain
benefits on the length of residency.60 Recognizing the policies behind
Shapiro, the Second Circuit in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing
Authority reasoned that "[i]t would be meaningless to describe the right
to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and
not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a
state."6 This quote is often echoed by proponents of the right to
intrastate travel.
The law in King required persons seeking public housing to reside
in the City of New Rochelle for at least five years before becoming
eligible. 62 This requirement plainly discriminates against both in-state
and out-of-state residents.63 Here, where the distinction is between city
residents and everyone else, it is unclear why the state line has any
importance.
Durational residency cases, both in the Supreme Court and lower
courts, provide broad dicta for courts to draw upon when determining
whether the right to travel freely on public fora is historically valued.
But it is difficult to analogize the social and economic protectionist
rationale that underlies the durational residency cases with the right to
localized travel. Perhaps the strength in this line of cases is the
recognition that the failure to cross state lines does not automatically
doom a right to travel claim.
57. Id. at 641. Shapiro actually considered three claims-two state statutes
invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a
District of Columbia statute invalidated under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 621-27.
58. Id. at 634.
59. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999); Hyland, supra note 28, at 194
(describing the third right mentioned in Saenz as "the right of migration").
60. See, e.g., Cole v. Hous. Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
61. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971).
62. King, 442 F.2d at 647.
63. Id. (Ms. King "moved from North Carolina to New Rochelle" and Ms. Frazier
"moved to New Rochelle from Yonkers, New York."); see Hyland, supra note 28, at 189-
90 (using a similar example as a hypothetical to "illustrate the intrastate right to travel
issue").
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3. A Right to Travel Freely on Public Fora
The strongest support for a fundamental right to travel freely on
public fora is provided by the Third Circuit's decision in Lutz v. City of
York,6 and the Sixth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. City of
Cincinnati.65 Both courts found the right in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 6  Lutz was authored in 1990 by Judge
Edward R. Becker of the Third Circuit; it appears to be the first case to
thoroughly research the right to localized travel and clearly articulate
why substantive due process protected the right.67
The ordinance in Lutz was one city's response to the growing
problem of "unnecessary repetitive driving," also known as "car
cruising." 68 Police set up a monitoring point on two main streets to
enforce the ordinance that criminalizes "driving a motor vehicle on a
street past a traffic control point .. . more than twice in any two (2) hour
period, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m." 69 A conviction
resulted in a fifty dollar fine.70
The question presented was a simple one: "whether the
constitutional right to travel extends to localized intrastate movement." 71
After analyzing the court defined the right to localized travel as "the right
to travel locally through public spaces and roadways."7 2 Finally, the
court concluded that the right was protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and
tradition."73  The cruising ordinance was upheld, however, after
application of an intermediate form of scrutiny.74
In Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that excluded individuals with
64. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
65. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002).
66. See Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267; Johnson, 310 F.3d at 489.
67. See, e.g., Lutz, 899 F.2d at 259-67.
68. Id. at 257-58 (describing the serious traffic congestion problem that resulted
from York's car cruisers, and affidavits of local police and firefighters detailing the
public health issues specifically attributed to the cruisers). See generally Steven N.
Gofman, Car Cruising: One Generation's Innocent Fun Becomes the Next Generation's
Crime, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 1 (2002).
69. Id. at 257 (citation omitted). The ordinance specifically exempted "[m]unicipal
and commercial vehicles." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.at261.
72. Id. at 268.
73. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see
infra Part III.A for a discussion of the substantive due process framework.
74. See infra Part III.B for a critique of using the time, place, and manner doctrine as
the degree of scrutiny for a checkpoint.
677
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
specific prior criminal drug convictions from sections of the city.75 The
ordinance made it a misdemeanor for these individuals to enter a "drug
exclusion zone."76 While a person could obtain a waiver for enumerated
reasons, such as living or working within the area, 7 the plaintiffs did not
fall within these exceptions, so their applications were denied.
Plaintiffs claimed the ordinance was unconstitutional on a number of
grounds, including, inter alia, freedom of speech and association, and
right to intrastate travel under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.7 9
The district court held that the ordinance was invalid as an
unconstitutional infringement of Plaintiffs' freedom of association and
"freedom of movement in the form of intrastate travel."so Importantly,
plaintiffs were also awarded $38,500 in fees.8 ' An intervening Ohio
Supreme Court decision, State v. Burnett,82 also invalidated the
ordinance on both federal and state constitutional grounds, defining the
intrastate right to travel as "the right to travel locally through public
spaces and roadways of this state." The Sixth Circuit decided that
plaintiffs' appeal was not moot because if no fundamental rights had
been violated, the district court's award of fees was erroneous.84
In reviewing relevant circuit precedent,85 the court did not find a
case that was directly on point.86  The court distinguished a legally
similar case, the 1976 decision in Wardwell v. Board of Education of the
City of Cincinnati,87 based on the type of ordinance-a "continuing
75. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487-88 (6th Cir. 2002).
76. See id. at 488 ("The Ordinance defines drug-exclusion zones as 'areas where the
number of arrests for ... drug-abuse related crimes for the twelve (12) month period
preceding the original designation is significantly higher than that for other similarly
situated/sized areas of the city."') (quoting Cincinnati Municipal Code § 755-5).
77. See id. at 487-88.
78. See id. at 489.
79. See id.
80. Id. For an overview of First Amendment law as it relates to travel claims, see
Jeanne M. Woods, Essay, Travel that Talks: Toward First Amendment Protection for
Freedom ofMovement, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 106 (1996).
81. See Johnson, 310 F.3d at 489-90.
82. State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 2001).
83. Id. at 865.
84. Johnson, 310 F.3d at 489-90 (analyzing the Burnett decision and deciding that
"the parties still have an actual case or controversy with respect to the district court's
award of attorney fees").
85. See id. at 493 (describing a common appellate rule that prior panel decisions are
binding on subsequent panels, and clarifying that "[t]his rule does not, however, extend to
dicta"); 6TH CIR. R. 206(c) ("Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent
panels.").
86. See id. Contra id. at 508-09 (Gilnan, J. dissenting) (interpreting Wardwell as
holding there is no fundamental right to intrastate travel).
87. Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Cincinatti, 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
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residency requirement."8  Johnson narrowly interpreted Wardwell's
holding by concluding that continuing residency requirements receive
less deferential rational basis review. 89 By distinguishing Wardwell, the
court was able to analyze the drug-exclusion zone under the Substantive
Due Process Clause.90 Johnson adopted the Third Circuit's definition of
the right, and concluded that "the right to travel locally through public
spaces and roadways" is a fundamental right. 91 The court, however,
disagreed with the Lutz court's decision to apply intermediate scrutiny.9 2
Instead, the Johnson court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate the
ordinance.9 3
C. A Description offHigh-Crime Exclusionary Checkpoints
Police checkpoints come in all shapes and sizes.94 As noted earlier,
the NSZs are not normal checkpoints. The unique feature of a high-
crime exclusionary checkpoint is that the motorist is denied entry to the
barricaded area if they do not provide a legitimate purpose for entering
the neighborhood. This interest is usually a personal, professional,
commercial, or expressive connection to the neighborhood. 95
Most jurists would analyze the NSZ checkpoints under the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures. 96 And checkpoints
have consistently been held to be "seizures" under the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.97 But upon closer inspection, this "seizure" is
88. See Johnson, 310 F.3d at 493-94.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 495-96. The decision by the Johnson court to distinguish Wardwell
also provides further evidence that the categorization set forth in this Comment is proper,
and that the right to intrastate travel should not be labeled as a "circuit split." See Sasse,
supra note 16, at 698-703 (creating the categorization in the first instance).
91. Seeid.at498.
92. See id. at 504-06.
93. See id.
94. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.7 (4th ed. 2004) ("Roadblocks or vehicle checkpoints are utilized by law
enforcement officers for a great variety of purposes."). This Comment has used the term
"checkpoint" because the MPD used this term to describe the NSZ program.
95. Watson, supra note 8, at 103 (defining a "high-crime area checkpoint" as
generally encompass[ing] a particular geographical area and involv[ing] blanket stops to
ascertain the individual's purpose for attempting to enter the area").
96. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . ."). Indeed the two most widely publicized high crime exclusionary seizures,
Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 664 (2d Cir. 1996), and Mills v. District of
Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2008), were both evaluated under the Fourth
Amendment's balancing test.
97. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) ("It is well
established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
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distinguishable from the temporary and limited intrusions that the
Supreme Court traditionally considers under the Fourth Amendment.98
Requiring a driver to stop at a checkpoint does constitute a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, but the government's restriction upon an
individual's liberty does not end when they leave the checkpoint. High-
crime area checkpoints are more like the drug exclusion zones at issue in
Johnson because they bar certain individuals from entering a specific
geographic area.99
The Neighborhood Safety Zone program is the most recent example
of a high-crime exclusionary checkpoint. 00 In Mills v. District of
Columbia, plaintiffs' class action challenged the constitutionality of the
NSZ as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and
sought, inter alia, an injunction against the future use of the NSZ.'o' The
District Court for the District of Columbia rejected plaintiffs' argument
that the NSZ's purpose was "generalized crime control" and therefore
unconstitutional under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.10 2  The D.C.
Circuit reversed, finding that the purpose of the roadblock program-to
deter and prevent crime-was an interest in generalized crime control,
and concluded an injunction must issue because of plaintiffs' high
likelihood of success on the merits. 0 3 The case was only litigated as a
Fourth Amendment challenge, and the plaintiffs in Mills did not press
any version of a right to travel claim. An evaluation of whether a right to
travel claim exists, and whether the NSZ is constitutional in light of this
claim, is a separate and distinct analysis that would be useful for future
litigation. An initial description of the NSZ program will provide
context for the subsequent discussion regarding whether there is a
fundamental right to localized travel.
On June 4, 2008, in response to recent violence in the Trinidad
neighborhood of Washington, D.C., the MPD enacted Special Order 08-
06 ("Special Order"), which authorized the NSZ checkpoint program.104
98. See id. at 55 (noting that when "[t]he lowered expectation of privacy in one's
automobile is coupled with the limited nature of the intrusion: a brief, standardized,
nonintrusive seizure" results).
99. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002).
100. The NSZ was implemented between June 7-12 and July 19-28, 2008. See Mills
v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 50, 52 (D.D.C. 2008).
101. Seeid.at50.
102. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). See generally Brooks Holland, The Road 'Round Edmond:
Steering Through Primary Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV.
293 (2006) (analyzing the "primary purpose" standard from Edmond).
103. Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1309-11 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 2009).
104. Mills, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 50-5 1. There were actually three Special Orders issued
during this case. They were: SO-08-06 # 1 (effective June 5, 2008, establishing the first
NSZ); SO-08-06 # 2 (effective July 18, 2008, establishing the second NSZ); and SO-08-
06 (effective July 24, 2008, authorizing a five-day extension of the second NSZ). The
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The NSZ checkpoints were first implemented on June 7, 2008, pursuant
to the guidelines set forth in the Special Order, which set up "eleven
vehicle checkpoints over the course of five days at locations around the
zone's perimeter."'0o Checkpoints were established between Saturday,
June 7 and Thursday, June 12, and between Saturday, July 19 and
Sunday, July 28.106
It was clear that the MPD intended a unique checkpoint specifically
designed to prevent the type of vehicle-related violence that plagued the
Trinidad neighborhood. 0 7 The MPD's solution was to limit vehicular
traffic'08 by using checkpoints to prevent vehicles without a "legitimate
purpose" from entering the area designated as a NSZ.109 The District
described the duties of the officers during the operation of the checkpoint
as follows:
[The Special Order] ... specifically dictates that officers staffing the
checkpoint are simply to inquire whether the operator of a stopped
vehicle has a legitimate reason for entering the NPZ along with such
additional information as would enable the officers to reasonably
verify the accuracy of the driver's stated reason. The inquiry was to
be and was limited to confirmation of the driver's residence in the
NSZ or identification of an invitation to a civic or community event
within the NSZ or of a contact phone number for the destination
address.' 1
main difference between the first and the subsequent orders was the removal of a data
monitoring requirement. Law enforcement officers were previously keeping track of
motorists at the checkpoints. See id. at 52 (discussing the change in the second NSZ
program).
105. Id. at 50.
106. See id. at 50, 52.
107. See id. at 50 (describing a "tragic triple-homicide" that occurred on May 31,
2008 and stating that in "the preceding year, the neighborhood had been subject to
twenty-five assaults involving a firearm, five of which resulted in homicides and six of
which involved the use of vehicles").
108. The Special Order stated that officers running the checkpoint were not
authorized to restrict the flow of pedestrian traffic entering or leaving the NSZ. See id. at
51 (describing that motorists denied entry or who refused to provide information were to
be informed that they were free to "park their vehicle outside the NSZ and enter the NSZ
on foot").
109. See id at 50 ("According to [Chief of Police] Cathy Lanier, the checkpoints
"served as a fence to keep violent criminals out of Trinidad," rather than "nets to capture
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See Opposition of Defendant District of Columbia to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 5-6, Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C.
2008) (No. 08-1061) (stating that "[alt no time were officers to travel to the location that
an operator identified as her destination under the NSZ Initiative").
681
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
When a NSZ program is in effect, therefore, the likelihood of
driving into the targeted neighborhood for an anniversary picnic depends
on whether your picnic is deemed a "legitimate reason" to enter.
The MPD Special Order establishing the program enumerated seven
purposes for entering Trinidad including:
(1) The person resides in the NSZ;
(2) The person is employed in the NSZ or is on a commercial
delivery;
(3) The person attends school or a day-care facility, or is taking a
child to, or picking up a child from, a school or day-care
facility in the NSZ;
(4) The person is a relative of a person who resides in the NSZ;
(5) The person is seeking medical attention, is elderly, or is
disabled; and/or
(6) The person is attempting to attend a verified organized civic,
community or religious event within the NSZ; or
[7] Entry could also be granted in exigent circumstances, but only
by an official the rank of Sergeant or above."'
It appears that "anniversary picnic" does not fit within any of the
enumerated categories, and therefore is not a sufficiently legitimate
purpose to allow entry into Trinidad. By enumerating certain classes, the
NSZ necessarily excluded everyone else from driving into the
neighborhood.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Substantive Due Process
The use of substantive due process is among the most contentious
topics in constitutional law today.1 2 Yet even the most conservative
Justices have recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects some
unenumerated rights."' 3 An active debate in this area is what analytical
111. Mills, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 51 n.1 (citing District of Columbia, Special Order #1
SO-08-06 (June 4, 2008)).
112. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C.
L. REv. 63, 64 (2006) (describing substantive due process as the most controversial
doctrine).
113. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
This Comment will not discuss the normative questions regarding the propriety of finding
unenumerated rights. See Earl M. Maltz and Ira C. Lupu, Judicial Competence and
Fundamental Rights, 78 MICH. L. REV. 284, 296 n.3 (1979) (noting that strict originalists
do not recognize the existence of any unenumerated rights).
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framework should be used to determine whether a right is protected by
the Constitution. 1 4  The Lutz court decided to use Justice Scalia's
"narrow" framework as articulated in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,1 5
reasoning that using this framework would reduce the possibility that the
judiciary was "overextending the doctrine" of substantive due process.116
The Supreme Court clearly described this test in Washington v.
Glucksberg:
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two
primary features.... [First,] we have required ... a "careful
description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. [Second,]
we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" . . . and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."117
The first requirement of Glucksberg-defining the liberty interest-
is a recurring and difficult question of question of constitutional law.
Often called the "level of generality" problem," 8 it has been defined as
"at what level of generality should the right previously protected, and the
right currently claimed, be described?""'9 Thankfully, this Comment can
fall back on the wisdom of the Third and Sixth Circuits that defined the
right as one "to travel locally through public spaces and roadways."l 2 0
114. It is unclear what the determinative test for finding unenumerated rights is in the
current Court. One commentator synthesized the Court's precedent into three types of
analysis: "historical tradition," "reasoned judgment," and "evolving national values." See
Conkle, supra note 112, at 64-68; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding
that the Substantive Due Process clause protects a fundamental right for consenting adults
to engage in homosexual conduct).
115. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1988). This test was reaffirmed by
the majority of the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati used the Glucksberg variation of the Michael H. test.
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002).
116. Lutz v. City of York 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Solely for purposes of
this appeal, we adopt Justice Scalia's view, not because it represents the views of the
Court, but because if a fundamental right of intrastate travel can be recognized under a
view of substantive due process expressly rejected by a majority of the Court as unduly
narrow, then clearly we will not have overextended the doctrine by so doing.") (footnote
omitted).
117. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted).
118. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE AND MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
73 (1991) (discussing the level of generality problem).
119. See TRIBE, supra note 118, at 73 (emphasis omitted); cf Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (proper level of generality at which to
describe the right is 'the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified"' (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S.
at 127 n.6 )).
120. Johnson, 310 F.3d at 495; Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268.
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The Supreme Court's focus on the right to travel across state lines
has created volumes of dicta that courts and commentators wield to
support the existence of a right to travel freely on public fora.12 ' And
while these words cannot be construed as holdings, they evidence a
historical tradition to protect localized travel. 12 2 One need only cherry-
pick from Supreme Court decisions, as did the Sixth Circuit in Johnson
v. City of Cincinnati, to conclude that a right to travel freely on public
fora enjoys a position deeply rooted in our nation's history. 123
Blackstone noted that "the personal liberty of individuals ...
consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving
one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct,
without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law." 24 The
Articles of Confederation expressly mentioned a right to travel, stating
that "the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and
from any other State.. .. 125 Early cases from the Supreme Court evince
a similar protection over travel to and from other states.12 6
The close relationship between interstate and intrastate travel has
also been stressed by many jurists.12 7 While discussing the invalidation
of segregation laws, the Court stressed that "[t]he right of any person to
travel interstate irrespective of race, creed, or color is protected by the
Constitution. Certainly his right to travel intrastate is as basic."1 2 8
Commentators have recognized that the right to travel freely on
public fora is a predicate right for the exercise of many other rights.129 If
this right is restricted, then other rights are restricted as well. How can
the right to interstate travel as developed by the Court truly be exercised
if a citizen does not have the right to travel to the state border? Similar
arguments have been made with respect to the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of association. 13 0
121. See, e.g., Johnson, 310 F.3d at 495-97.
122. See, e.g., id.
123. See id. at 495-500; Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990);
Sasse, supra note 16, at 703-07.
124. 1 William Blackstone Commentaries * 134.
125. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV (1781); see Porter, supra note 16, at 821-
22.
126. "The constitutional right to travel from one State to another ... occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been
firmly established and repeatedly recognized." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757
(1966).
127. See, e.g., supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
128. Bell v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255 (1964); see McCool v. City of
Philadelphia, 494 F. Supp. 2d 307, 313-14 (E.D. Pa 2007) (concluding that the "right to
intrastate travel . . . encompasses the right to change residences within a state").
129. See, e.g., Sasse, supra note 16, at 706.
130. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 266 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)).
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Considered in a different way, the right to travel freely is merely a
statement that the government cannot restrain a citizen's liberty without
sufficient justification; "Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska and
continuing through Focha v. Louisiana, the Court has consistently
assumed that the Due Process Clause 'encompasses freedom from bodily
restraint and punishment.' Indeed, the Court has been 'careful not to
'minimize the importance and fundamental nature' of the individual's
right to liberty.'" 1 31 When the historical treatment of a citizen's liberty
interest is viewed in this way, it seems more natural to accept a
fundamental right to travel freely on public fora.
The Supreme Court's loitering precedents also show a strong
historical tradition of protecting citizens' right to free movement. In City
of Chicago v. Morales, the Court relied on the vagueness doctrine to
strike down a Chicago ordinance that prohibits gang members from
loitering in public places.132 And while the Court did not recognize a
"fundamental right to loiter,"' 3 3 its message is clear:
[T]he freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We have expressly identified this "right to remove from one place to
another according to inclination" as "an attribute or personal liberty"
protected by the Constitution. Indeed, it is apparent that an
individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as
much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside
frontiers that is "a part of our heritage." 34
If a plurality of the Court in Morales supported the freedom to remain in
a public place without arbitrary interference, it follows that an individual
has the freedom to initially travel to that public place. 35
B. Defining a Level of Scrutiny
The recognition of a fundamental right to travel freely on public
fora does not mean that traffic laws no longer apply, or that a person has
the right to drive through a street fair. The Third Circuit in Lutz
explained the delicate balancing at the heart of selecting the appropriate
level of scrutiny:
131. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 705 (footnotes omitted).
132. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45 (1999).
133. See id. at 53 n.20. But see id. at 84 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (criticizing the
plurality's support for a fundamental right to loiter).
134. Id. at 53-54 (citations omitted).
135. Part II of the Morales opinion was written by Justice Stevens, and was joined by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. See id. at 44.
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[J]ust as the right to speak cannot conceivably imply the right to
speak whenever, wherever and however one pleases-even in public
fora specifically used for public speech-so too the right to travel
cannot conceivably imply the right to travel whenever, wherever and
however one pleases-even on roads specifically designed for public
travel. Unlimited access to public fora or roadways would result not
in maximizing individuals' opportunity to engage in protected
activity, but chaos. To prevent that, state and local governments must
enjoy some degree of flexibility to regulate access to, and use of, the
publicly held instrumentalities of speech and travel. 136
The history of travel on public fora is a highly regulated one;
indeed, a central purpose of regulation is to facilitate travel.,37 In most
areas of the law, the selection of the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny
to analyze regulations is simple. If a law infringes upon a fundamental
right, it is upheld only if it survives strict scrutiny.'38 This heightened
review requires the law to be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest."l 3 9  If a law infringes upon a right which is not
fundamental, it is subjected to rational basis review. This requires it to
be "rationally related to legitimate government interests." 4 0
It is clear that the typical application of strict scrutiny to a right to
localized travel would not be rational, or judicially defensible. The state
would bear the burden of proof to uphold the law against a tough
standard based on very minor infringements.141 Granted, this is the
framework the Supreme Court uses when evaluating durational residency
restrictions against interstate travel challenges.14 2 But the frequency with
which the right to localized travel is slightly restricted and the substantial
policy differences between the two doctrines mandate a different
result. 143
136. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990).
137. See id.; Roger I. Roots, The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by
Automobile, 1890-1950, 30 OKLAHOMA CITY U. L. REv. 245, 259-61 (2005) (describing
the history of the driver's license).
138. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
139. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
140. Id. at 728.
141. See Part III.C infra discussing the application of strict scrutiny.
142. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 491 (1999).
143. Compare id. at 504-05 (invalidating a California welfare law using the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminated slightly against
those who were moving into the state) with Five Borough Bicycle Club v. City of New
York, 483 F. Supp. 2d 351, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (recognizing that "[w]hen a statute or
regulation has "[m]erely an effect on travel," it does not "raise an issue of constitutional
dimension" (quoting Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 266,
278 (2d Cir. 1985)) (alteration in original).
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A more flexible standard of judicial review must be found, one that
protects individual rights while allowing the Government to restrict those
rights to protect the public interest. The Lutz court applied the "time,
place, and manner" doctrine from First Amendment jurisprudence to the
curfew law.144 This doctrine is a version of intermediate scrutiny that is
used to determine whether governmental restrictions on free speech in
public fora are constitutional. 145
However, the time, place, and manner doctrine applies intermediate
scrutiny to all restrictions on travel. The straightforward application of
intermediate scrutiny, without an exception for de minimis infringement,
might invalidate useful and necessary government regulation on travel.
This form of intermediate scrutiny has been described as being both
"overprotective and underprotective" of the right to travel on public
fora.14 6  As mentioned earlier, traffic control measures are meant to
prevent the chaos that would naturally result if there was no regulation.147
For this reason, "incidental" burdens on the right to localized travel
should not be subjected to heightened scrutiny.148 An intermediate level
of scrutiny would also fail to protect the right against certain "direct"
burdens, such as the NSZ program, because they arguably satisfy the
standard. Instead, strict scrutiny should apply to ensure that the
fundamental right to localized travel is protected. 149
A novel solution to this problem is to apply the "undue burden"
standard from the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey to the travel context.' 50 At its core, this standard recognizes that
not all infringements on liberty interests are unwarranted.' 5 ' A
restriction is considered an undue burden if "a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of' the
exercise of a fundamental right.152 A restriction that constituted an undue
burden would be subjected to review under strict scrutiny.15 3
144. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990).
145. See ROTUNDA, supra note 67, § 20.47(a) at 459.
146. Sasse, supra note 16, at 708.
147. See Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269; Sasse, supra note 16, at 707-09.
148. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 708 (using traffic lights as an example of an
"incidental" burden and a curfew law as an example of a "direct" burden).
149. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 708.
150. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992); see Sasse, supra
note 16, at 708.
151. See id. at 876 (recognizing that "[t]he very notion that the State has a substantial
interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed
unwarranted").
152. Id. at 877; see Sasse, supra note 16, at 709.
153. See Sasse, supra note 16, at 709. The Casey plurality considered an undue
burden on the right to an abortion as an invalid infringement per se. See Casey, 505 U.S.
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This modified undue burden level of scrutiny appears to be a
workable standard because it does not function any differently than the
normal strict scrutiny analysis for most restrictive or "blanket" bans.15 4
Using the drug-exclusion zone from Johnson v. City of Cincinnati as an
example, a court would find that the ordinance completely bars certain
individuals from exercising their right to localized travel.' 55  This
ordinance would constitute an undue burden, and a reviewing court
would apply strict scrutiny. The result would be the same if the NSZ
checkpoints were evaluated because individual's right to travel freely on
public fora is restricted.156 Thus, the result is the same under both the
undue burden standard and the traditional strict scrutiny standard.
C. Analysis of the NSZ Program
An analysis under strict scrutiny requires a court to use its
independent judgment to determine whether a law is "narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest."' 57  The state bears the burden of
proof throughout this analysis.' 58 The first step is to identify the state
interest at issue, and then determine whether it can be considered
"compelling." The state interest is also referred to as the "state's
purpose."1 59 The second step requires the state to "show that the law is
necessary to achieve the objective."' 60 The Johnson court provided a
good overview of the analysis at this step:
To determine whether the [law] is narrowly tailored to achieve the
City's compelling interest in reducing ... drug-related crime, we ...
determine whether the [law] is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the City's goal. In making this latter inquiry, we ask
whether any other methods exist to achieve the desired results of
enhancing the quality of life and protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of citizens in high drug-crime neighborhoods. If there are
other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of
at 876-77. Commentator Sasse frames the question as a "threshold inquiry," which this
author agrees is more doctrinally sound. Sasse, supra note 16, at 709.
154. This is because the threshold inquiry would almost always be satisfied with a
broad restriction on the fundamental right to localized travel. The strict scrutiny analysis
would then determine whether the restriction is unconstitutional.
155. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 502 (6th Cir. 2002).
156. See supra Part II.
157. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
158. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1986).
159. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES, § 10.1 (3d ed. 2006).
160. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 159, at § 10.1.
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greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose less drastic
161means.
1. Compelling State Interest
It is clear that the MPD's interest in deterring homicides, drive-by
shootings, and drug-related violence is an important one. The NSZ
checkpoints targeted the most violent section of D.C., which had a
reported 22 homicides between January 1 and June 5, 2008.162 The July
19 NSZ checkpoint was established in response to multiple homicides
that were linked to drive-by shootings. 16 3  The Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that "[i]t is a traditional exercise of the States
police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens."1 6 4
In the end, a reviewing court might uphold the state's interest as
compelling, or even gloss over the analysis to determine whether the
construction of the program is narrowly tailored. This author recognizes
the dire and complex problems that violent crime presents. Moreover,
protecting the residents of Trinidad from realistic threats of homicide is
undoubtedly an important interest, and arguably the most compelling
interest the state could assert. It is unclear whether searching judicial
review would invalidate the NSZ based on the MPD's asserted purpose.
Because of this uncertainty, the following analysis will assume that a
reviewing court concludes that the MPD's purpose is sufficiently
compelling.
2. Least Restrictive Alternative
The state must next prove that the law is the least restrictive
alternative. This analysis requires the law to be necessary to achieve the
previously asserted state interest.165 Professor Chemerinsky notes that no
formula exists for "deciding whether a means is necessary or whether a
less restrictive means can suffice. The government's burden when there
is an infringement of a fundamental right is to prove that no other
alternative, less restrictive of the right, can work." 6 6
161. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 503 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
162. See Police to Check Drivers, supra note 2 ("The 5th Police District, which
includes Trinidad, has had 22 killings this year, one more than all of last year. Since
April 1, the Trinidad neighborhood has had seven homicides, 16 robberies and 20
assaults with dangerous weapons, according to police data.").
163. Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 52 (D.D.C. 2008).
164. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
165. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 159, at § 10.1.
166. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 159, at § 10.1.
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When this searching inquiry is applied to the manner in which the
NSZ checkpoint infringed on the fundamental right to travel freely on
public fora, the government bears a heavy, if not impossible, burden.
The difficulty of the burden is compounded in the area of crime control,
where myriad legislative actions are available to remedy this problem.
The efforts of the MPD to narrowly tailor this program will be reviewed,
along with what appear to be significant oversights in certain areas.
Ultimately, the MPD will likely fail to meet its burden of proof that the
NSZ program is necessary to achieve its purpose of reducing violent
crime and deterring drive-by shootings. The MPD simply has too many
alternative methods to reduce crime in Trinidad for a court to conclude
that this roadblock program is necessary. The Special Order establishing
the NSZ program could therefore be invalidated as an unconstitutional
restriction of the right to travel freely on public fora.
In Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit invalidated an
ordinance that excluded those with a prior criminal drug conviction from
entering a specified area. 16 7  Like the determination of where NSZ
checkpoints are placed, 16 8 objective criteria in the form of crime data was
used to determine what neighborhoods became drug-exclusionary
zones.169 Unlike the NSZ program, however, the individuals being
excluded from the area in Johnson had a direct reason for being excluded
from that specific area, namely their prior drug convictions. Deciding
which individuals were excluded from entering Trinidad was not about
the relationship a person had with the area; it was about the absence of a
relationship. This critical difference between the two programs clearly
shows that the NSZ is not narrowly tailored. The Johnson ordinance
excluded a specific group of people, exempting all others and allowing
these individuals to freely exercise their right to localized travel. The
NSZ program included a specific group of people, subjected them to a
burden, 170 and excluded every other individual in the country. Moreover,
167. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487-88 (6th Cir. 2002).
168. Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 56 n.3 (D.D.C. 2008) ("The
Special Order states that the following types of evidence may support the existence of a
neighborhood violent crime problem sufficient to establish a NSZ: pertinent violent crime
data, information contained in citizen and community reports and complaints relevant to
documented violent crimes, and information gathered from criminal intelligence sources
relevant to documented violent crimes.").
169. See Johnson, 310 F.3d at 488 ("The Ordinance defines drug-exclusion zones as
'areas where the number of arrests for . .. drug-abuse related crimes for the twelve (12)
month period preceding the original designation is significantly higher than that for other
similarly situated/sized areas of the city."' (quoting Cincinnati Municipal Code § 755-5)).
170. A Trinidad resident with valid identification that goes through one NSZ
checkpoint is arguably burdened as much as a person subjected to one DUI checkpoint.
Clearly, however, the burdens of continuously driving through the checkpoints, social
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the checkpoints excluded the vast majority of people, none of whom had
been individually adjudicated as guilty of a crime.
The least restrictive alternative standard is simply phrased, but often
difficult to implement. Often this is because there are political, social,
and moral considerations that would influence jurists contemplating the
constitutionality of the NSZ program. From a strictly legal standpoint,
the NSZ program is not necessary to effectuate the District's goals of
protecting their citizens. Indeed, the NSZ was doomed the moment that
the "narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny was rephrased as
requiring the program to be "necessary" to achieve the state's purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia, like most major metropolitan areas and
many rural communities, is in the midst of a crisis. As the local and
national media daily report, the sale and use of illicit drugs in the
District of Columbia has combined in recent years with long-standing
problems of economic and social inequity to create an unprecedented
explosion of violence. The drug scourge and its accompanying
violence tend to make victims of those who can bear it least: the
poor, minorities and the disadvantaged.
The disease is undisputed; the question is how to cure. Facile, knee-
jerk responses will not suffice. Just as mere punishment will never
cure the drug addict, so mere martial tactics will never wean the
District from its addiction to violence and illegal trafficking in drugs.
Having said this, the Court emphasizes that any legislative response
to the District's crisis is none of this Court's business, except insofar
as it may impact upon the constitutional rights of the District's
citizenry. n
These strong words were crafted nineteen years before the NSZ
program was conceived, but are equally applicable today. 17 2 Problems
common to troubled neighborhoods-street crime, narcotics, gang
warfare, drive-by shootings-exist because of other, more systemic
problems such as unemployment, poverty, and lack of education.
Solutions to these underlying problems obviously cannot be found in
checkpoint programs or increased police presence alone. But when
solutions are attempted, even in a neighborhood that needs immediate
stigmatization, and the inaccessibility to many friends who are excluded make the
checkpoints incomparable.
171. Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1127 (D.D.C. 1989) (invalidating a District
of Columbia curfew ordinance).
172. The first day of the NSZ was on June 7, 2008. Mills, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
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help, the government must not infringe upon an individual's liberty
interest without sufficient justification. The promise of an immediate
end to violence cannot excuse nearsighted police tactics.
